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The United States‘ Response to Humanitarian Refugee 
Obligations: Inconsistent Application of Legal 
Standards and Its Consequences 
Andrea Freiberger  
INTRODUCTION 
One of the defining events of the twentieth century, World War II, 
occurred simultaneously with the genocide of millions of men, 
women, and children in the Holocaust.
1
 After such atrocities, the 
international community recognized an obligation to never again 
enable the persecution of innocent populations.
2
 In 1948, the 
countries of the United Nations (―U.N.‖) adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (―Declaration‖).3 The Declaration 
 
 
 J.D. (2009), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Economics (2005), College 
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 1. The genocide commonly known as the Holocaust is defined by one source as ―the 
systematic state-sponsored killing of six million Jewish men, women, and children and millions 
of others by Nazi Germany and its collaborators during World War II.‖ Holocaust, 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 2009, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/269548/ 
Holocaust (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). When non-Jewish victims are included, estimates using 
the broadest definitions state that the death toll may have reached seventeen million. DONALD 
L. NIEWYK & FRANCIS R. NICOSIA, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST 45 (2000). 
 2. For information regarding the impact of World War II on refugee movements and the 
international recognition of a need for a concerted response, see GIL LOESCHER ET AL., THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR): THE POLITICS AND 
PRACTICE OF REFUGEE PROTECTION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (2008), and GIL 
LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL REFUGEE 
CRISIS 42–44 (1993) [hereinafter LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY]. 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (―Declaration‖), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Declaration], 
available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. The first sentence of the Preamble is 
indicative of the document as a whole and recognizes ―the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world.‖ Id. The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on December 10, 1948, 
and asked member countries ―to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded 
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formally asserted the right to seek and receive asylum from 
persecution.
4
 At the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (―1951 Convention‖),5 this right was developed into the 
principle of non-refoulement, whereby signatories agreed not to 
return anyone to a country in which there was a danger of 
persecution.
6
 
As a practical matter, these rights are implemented through 
domestic asylum policies.
7
 Immigration laws generally dictate that a 
refugee within a country‘s borders has legal status and is permitted to 
stay.
8
 In addition to its domestic asylum policy, the United States 
implements a voluntary overseas resettlement program, through 
which it brings refugees harbored in other countries to the United 
States.
9
  
Although the principle of non-refoulement requires countries to 
give legal status to refugees within their borders, countries have 
discretion in determining who meets the definition of a refugee.
10
 By 
altering how refugee status is determined, countries can, in effect, 
control and limit whom they admit and the humanitarian obligation 
they assume.
11
 This control is of great interest to the United States, 
which has historically been opposed to accepting unquantifiable and 
 
principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the 
political status of countries or territories.‖ Description and Text of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, http://un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 4. Declaration, supra note 3, art. 14. 
 5. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jul. 28 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 6. See id.; infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 7. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 894 (5th ed. 2009) (―[H]ow the United States internally allocates 
the responsibility for implementing those international legal obligations [assumed under the 
1967 Protocol] is a matter of domestic United States law.‖). The domestic United States law 
regarding asylum policy is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).  
 8. See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 10. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (defining ―refugee‖). Additionally, the 
Attorney General is responsible for creating the procedures for asylum application. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(d)(1) (2006). 
 11. The United States, for example, has cited control over the admittance of refugees as a 
primary reason for encouraging different standards depending on whether an applicant is in the 
United States or overseas: ―This difference in emphasis is appropriate because the United States 
remains in full control of the volume of overseas admissions in any case.‖ See infra note 116 
and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] The U.S. Response to Humanitarian Refugee Obligations 299 
 
 
uncontrollable obligations.
12
 The United States has aligned its 
adjudication process to channel refugees through the voluntary 
resettlement process, as opposed to the domestic asylum process.
13
 In 
terms of obligations imposed by international humanitarian law, 
admittances through the overseas resettlement process are completely 
voluntary, as opposed to admittances of refugees located within a 
country‘s borders, which are required by the duty of non-
refoulement.
14
  
This Note seeks to draw attention to the intentional application of 
different standards for refugee determinations and proposes a fairer 
alternative to achieving the interests of the United States.
15
 Part I 
provides general background on the refugee issue. Part I.A discusses 
the different aspects of international refugee law. Part I.A.1 describes 
the humanitarian concerns associated with refugees and their plight. 
Part I.A.2 details the formation of the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (―UNHCR‖) as an international response 
to these concerns. Part I.B discusses the practical solutions currently 
used to handle protracted refugee situations, including refugee camps, 
voluntary repatriation, integration, and resettlement, and further 
addresses the duty of non-refoulement and the disparity in obligations 
this creates for different countries. Part I.C examines the United 
States‘ relationship with refugee situations, and looks in particular at 
its asylum policy, its resettlement policy, and the degree to which it 
fulfills its humanitarian obligations. Part II analyses the United 
States‘ policies toward refugees, specifically comparing the legal 
standards used for adjudication in domestic applications for asylum 
with those used in overseas applications for resettlement. It concludes 
that the United States policy achieves predictability, but (1) runs 
contrary to the spirit of non-refoulement, (2) increases the burden of 
unpredictability for other countries, and (3) increases inconsistent 
 
 12. See LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–16 (discussing the historical development 
of the international refugee regime after World War II). ―Despite the scale of the global refugee 
crisis, however, the US was unwilling to pledge unlimited support to refugees and actively 
opposed the international community committing itself to unspecified and future 
responsibilities.‖ Id. at 12. 
 13. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 14. See 1951 Convention, supra note 5. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
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adjudication. Part III presents a proposal that would help to achieve 
predictability while eliminating some adverse effects of the current 
system. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of Refugee Law 
1. The Refugee Problem 
One of the greatest indicators of human suffering is the physical 
displacement of individuals from their homes.
16
 For many, fleeing the 
home means entering an existence as a refugee without basic food, 
clothing, and shelter.
17
 Flight breaks up families and communities 
with the result that both material and psychological support systems 
disappear.
18
 Approximately fifty percent of displaced populations are 
under the age of eighteen and therefore are especially susceptible to 
safety threats.
19
 This vulnerability makes refugees the object of 
significant humanitarian concern.
20
  
 
 16. LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at xii (―Physical displacement is prima facie evidence 
of vulnerability because people who are deprived of their homes and communities and means of 
livelihood are unable to resort to traditional coping capacities.‖). 
 17. Reports of emergency humanitarian assistance reflect the need of refugee populations. 
See UN Rushing Relief Supplies for Somali Refugees in Ethiopia, UN NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 6, 
2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29799&Cr=somali&Cr1= 
refuge; Central African Republic Refugees Pouring into Chad in Dire Need of Help—UN, UN 
NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29801&Cr= 
Chad&Cr1=Refuge. Novels may paint a more comprehensive picture of the day-to-day 
struggles of refugees. See, e.g., DAVE EGGERS, WHAT IS THE WHAT (2006) (chronicling the 
experiences of Valentino Achak Deng, one of the ―Lost Boys‖ of Sudan). 
 18. See Marina Ajdukovic & Dean Ajdukovic, Impact of Displacement on the 
Psychological Well-Being of Refugee Children, 10 INT‘L REV. PSYCHIATRY 186 (1998) 
(discussing the adverse psychological effects of displacement on children).  
 19. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, The State of the World‘s Refugees 20–22 (2006) (according 
to a 2003 survey of approximately 7.5 million persons of concern to UNHCR).  
The large number of young people among displaced populations has important 
implications for protection. Displaced children and adolescents are particularly 
vulnerable to threats to their safety and wellbeing. These include separation from their 
families, sexual exploitation, HIV/AIDS infection, forced labour or slavery, abuse and 
violence, forcible recruitment into armed groups, trafficking, lack of access to 
education and basic assistance, detention and denial of access to asylum or family-
reunification procedures. Unaccompanied children are at greatest risk, since they lack 
the protection, physical care, and emotional support provided by the family.  
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In most cases, the displaced have fled interstate or internal 
conflict, widespread human rights abuses, or both.
21
 The causes of 
movement are primarily ―war, ethnic strife, and sharp socioeconomic 
inequalities.‖22 According to recent estimates, there are almost 
sixteen million refugees
23
 and twenty-six million internally displaced 
persons (―IDPs‖) worldwide.24  
2. International Response: Formation of the UNHCR 
As World War II ended, thirty-five to forty million displaced 
people flowed toward the center of Europe,
25
 an unprecedented 
population shift of enormous magnitude.
26
 The strain of such 
numbers on the already war-torn continent forced international 
recognition of the need to deal with refugee concerns.
27
  
On December 14, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees (―the Statute of the UNHCR‖).28 The Statute of the 
 
Id. at 20 (citing UNHCR, Global Consultations on Int‘l Prot., Refugee Children, 1, U.N. Doc. 
EC/GC/02/9 (Apr. 25, 2002)). 
 20. The destitution of refugees affects not only the displaced population, but also the 
regions into which they disperse. See discussion and sources cited infra notes 74–76. Most 
refugees move from one Lesser Developed Country (―LDC‖) to another, and their presence 
often puts a significant strain on neighboring countries‘ struggling economies and weak 
political infrastructures. See LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 2, at 8. Such strain can 
cause a conflict to spread and perpetuate further humanitarian and refugee crises. See infra 
notes 44–45. 
 21. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 16. See generally id. at 10–18. 
 22. LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 2, at 12. 
 23. Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Annual Report Shows 42 Million People Uprooted 
Worldwide (June 16, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4a2fd52412d.html. Both in the vernacular 
and according to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, refugees are defined as those who have fled 
across the border of their country of origin. 1951 Convention, supra note 5, art. 1; see 
LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at xii. The text of the Convention is available on the United 
Nations High Commission for Human Rights Website at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 
html.  
 24. UNHCR Annual Report, supra note 23. In contrast to refugees, who by definition have 
crossed an international border, internally displaced persons have been forced from their homes, 
but remain within the borders of their own country. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, 
at 153. ―Often persecuted or under attack by their own governments, they are frequently in a 
more desperate situation than refugees.‖ Id. 
 25. LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 20, at 46. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. 
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UNCHR provided authority for the adoption of the 1951 Convention 
on the Status of Refugees, at which U.N. member states created the 
office of the UNHCR.
29
 The UNHCR is the principal U.N. program 
for dealing with refugees today.
30
 The Statute of the UNHCR 
establishes the twofold objective of the UNHCR as: (1) protecting 
refugees and (2) finding permanent solutions for their plight.
31
 The 
initial mandate lasted three years and was repeatedly renewed, 
usually for five years at a time.
32
 In December 2003, the temporal 
limitation was finally eliminated and the Office was confirmed as a 
department of the U.N.
33
 The UNHCR has grown from thirty-four 
employees in the 1950s to its current level of 6,500 employees in 116 
countries.
34
 Its annual budget for the past several years has exceeded 
$1 billion U.S. dollars.
35
 The UNHCR is the only global organization 
whose mandate is to protect refugees and ―find solutions to their 
plight.‖36 Other departments of the U.N. have avoided involvement in 
refugee affairs, largely because they see them as issues handled by 
the UNHCR.
37
  
 
 29. Id. at 1–2. Meetings held between 1948 and 1950 led to the establishment of the 
UNHCR. Id. at 12. 
 30. See id. at 1. 
 31. Id. at 13. 
 32. Id. at 75. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 79. 
 35. Id. As established by the Statute, the U.N. funds only the administrative costs of 
running the UNHCR; ―all other expenditures relating to the activities of the High 
Commissioner shall be financed by voluntary contributions.‖ Id. at 14. The voluntary 
contributions of donor countries therefore make up the majority of the UNHCR‘s budget, and 
donor countries‘ approval of UNHCR activities is therefore extremely important. The ability to 
withhold contributions gives main donors significant influence over the organization‘s work. Id. 
at 14, 73. The United States is the largest contributor to the UNHCR, donating 30.5 percent of 
the organization‘s total budget in fiscal year 2006. Id. at 93 fig.4.2. 
 36. Id. at 73. 
 37. See id. at 76.  
Notwithstanding [the] increased involvement of the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council, there is a widespread perception within the UN system that refugees are 
UNHCR‘s ―problem.‖ This perception, likely a result of the territoriality and 
competition between UN agencies that dominated the 1990s, has frustrated efforts to 
articulate a more comprehensive and holistic engagement in issues relating to refugees. 
Id. 
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B. Practical Solutions 
1. Short-term Solutions: Refugee Camps 
As a short-term solution in cases of large refugee populations, the 
UNHCR or a host country may set up a refugee camp.
38
 Although not 
intended as long-term solutions, there are many instances of refugee 
populations living in camps for decades.
39
 The UNHCR has 
recognized ―that indefinite encampment is unacceptable‖ and can 
lead to violations of internationally recognized human rights.
40
 
Camps run the risk of creating dependent populations, the likelihood 
of which increases the longer refugees remain.
41
 Camps also pose 
safety and security problems.
42
 The incidence of physical and sexual 
violence within camps is a concern, especially because the majority 
of refugees are women and children.
43
 In the case of protracted 
refugee situations, tension may develop between refugees and their 
host country.
44
 This can result in local violence, but may also 
 
 38. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 22. ―According to UNHCR‘s 2003 
demographic data, of the 13.1 million displaced persons of concern to the organization, some 36 
per cent were located in camps or centres. . . .‖ Id. ―In Africa, almost half the people of concern 
to UNHCR are in camps, as compared to less than a quarter in Asia.‖ Id. ―Many host 
governments now require the vast majority of refugees to live in designated camps, and place 
restrictions on those seeking to leave the camps for employment or education.‖ Id. at 114–15. 
 39. Id. at 22; see generally id. at 106–27 (describing trends, causes, and implications of 
various protracted refugee situations). ―[D]ozens of protracted refugee situations remain 
unresolved in highly volatile and conflict-prone regions.‖ Id. at 118; see also id. at 116–17 (box 
5.2 describes the protracted Bhutanese refugee situation in Nepal). ―Approximately 103,000 
Bhutanese Lhotshampas have been confined to several refugee camps in south-eastern Nepal 
since 1990. This protracted refugee situation is a source of regional tension between Nepal, 
Bhutan and India. If left unresolved, it may set a dangerous precedent in a region rife with 
ethnic and communal tension.‖ Id.  
 40. Id. at 130. ―The prolonged encampment of refugee populations has led to the violation 
of a number of rights contained in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, including freedom of 
movement and the right to seek wage-earning employment.‖ Id. at 115. ―Their lives may not be 
at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain 
unfulfilled after years in exile.‖ Id. at 106 (citing UNHCR, Executive Comm. of the High 
Comm‘r‘s Programme, Standing Comm., Protracted Refugee Situations, 1, UN Doc. EC/54/ 
SC/CRP.14 (June 10, 2004)). 
 41. Id. (―UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as ‗one in which refugees find 
themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo . . . . A refugee in this situation is 
often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.‘‖). 
 42. See id. at 114–18. 
 43. Id. at 115. 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 116 (box 5.2 describes tensions created by the encampment of over one 
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engender ill will on a national level and cause significant future 
conflict.
45
 
2. Long-term (Durable) Solutions 
There are three long-term or durable solutions for refugee 
populations: voluntary repatriation, integration, and resettlement.
46
  
a. Voluntary Repatriation 
When possible, voluntary repatriation, or returning to the home 
country, is considered the preferred durable solution.
47
 Repatriation 
can have beneficial aspects for all parties involved: for refugees, a 
desirable alternative to living in a prolonged refugee situation; for 
host countries, a way to lighten the burden of the refugee population; 
and for home countries, an opportunity to rebuild after a period of 
conflict or human rights abuse.
48
 The right to return to one‘s home 
country has been recognized as a universal human right,
49
 which 
 
hundred thousand Bhutanese refugees in south-eastern Nepal). ―This protracted refugee 
situation is a source of regional tension between Nepal, Bhutan and India. If left unresolved, it 
may set a dangerous precedent in a region rife with ethnic strife and communal tension.‖ Id. at 
116. 
 45. Id. at 116–18. In addition to the example of the Bhutanese in Nepal, ―[t]he presence of 
Burmese refugees on the Thai border has been a frequent source of tension between the 
governments in Bangkok and Rangoon.‖ Id. at 117. Furthermore, ―[a]ccording to UNHCR, ‗the 
failure to address the problems of the Rwandan refugees in the 1960s contributed substantially 
to the cataclysmic violence of the 1990s.‘‖ Id. at 118 (citing UNCHR, THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD‘S REFUGEES: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 49 (2000)). ―Tutsis who fled 
Rwanda between 1959 and 1962 and their descendents filled the ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front which invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. Many of these refugees had been 
living in the region for more than three decades.‖ Id. 
 46. Id. at 6. Specifically pursuing these three options as durable solutions is considered 
part of the UNHCR‘s core mandate responsibilities. LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. 
 47. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 30 (―[R]epatriation is now often regarded 
as the most desirable durable solution—provided that return is genuinely voluntary and 
sustainable.‖).  
 48. The connection between repatriation and rebuilding after conflict is demonstrated by 
the 4R concept of repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. See id. at 133. 
The 4R concept is accepted as a successful method to achieve sustainable repatriation in a state 
of origin. Id. ―It simply combines the notion of voluntary repatriation with the idea of post-
conflict reconstruction.‖ Id.  
 49. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Voluntary Repatriation: Legal and Policy Issues, in REFUGEES 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255, 258 & n.9, 259 n.10 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan 
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supports the notion that the international community should make 
efforts to facilitate voluntary repatriation. The United Nations 
General Assembly took this view and adopted the UNHCR Statute 
requiring governments to help promote voluntary repatriation.
50
  
Although preferred under ideal circumstances, voluntary 
repatriation is often not a feasible solution.
51
 Evaluating safety 
conditions in the country of origin is far from an exact science, and 
determining when conditions are safe for refugees to return is often 
an issue of significant debate.
52
 Furthermore, repatriation must be 
voluntary,
53
 and even when international organizations and involved 
countries agree conditions are safe, refugees themselves may doubt 
these evaluations and resist repatriation.
54
 Desire to find a solution 
combined with the legally mandated requirement to facilitate 
repatriation can at times turn what is supposed to be encouragement 
into coercion.
55
 Retrospective review of circumstances surrounding 
the repatriation of millions in the 1990s has highlighted the need to 
ensure that repatriation is in fact feasible and voluntary.
56
  
b. Integration 
In the event that repatriation is not an option, a second possible 
durable solution is integration into the local host community.
57
 While 
 
eds., 1989) (citing, inter alia, articles nine and thirteen of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights).  
 50. See id. at 258. 
 51. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 130. 
 52. For instance, ―arguably premature repatriations to the former Yugoslav republics and 
Afghanistan in the early 2000s . . . renewed debate on sustainable reintegration and its 
relationship to post-conflict reconstruction.‖ Id.  
 53. See id. at 129–30. ―However, returns under pressure from host governments—
particularly the 1996 return of Rwandan refugees hosted by Zaire (now the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, or DRC) and Tanzania—have raised fresh questions about the degree or 
voluntariness and the role of compulsion . . . .‖ Id. at 130. 
 54. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 49, at 275–77 (discussing the example of Chadian 
refugees in west Sudan in 1986 who resisted efforts by the UNHCR and other organizations to 
initiate large-scale repatriation). 
 55. See id. at 277–80 (chronicling repatriation from Djibouti to Ethiopia in 1986–87 and 
demonstrating the difficulties in encouraging repatriation without coercing). 
 56. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 130.  
 57. See id. at 134–37, especially Box 6.1, for a discussion of efforts to promote 
integration into host communities. 
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integration into a community is the goal of any long-term solution, 
initial countries of refuge may be reluctant to accept refugees 
permanently.
58
 Integration can cause significant strain to already 
struggling economies, a problem that often fuels cultural clashes and 
local resentment.
59
  
c. Resettlement 
The third durable solution is resettlement to a third country.
60
 
―Resettlement may be defined as the transfer of refugees from a state 
in which they have initially sought protection to a third state that has 
agreed to admit them with permanent-residence status.‖61 For 
example, a Rwandan refugee who fled to a camp in Kenya might be 
transported to a third country, such as Canada, for resettlement. The 
main countries that resettle refugees are the United States, Australia, 
Canada, Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand.
62
 Resettlement has 
been recognized as a way for developed countries further removed 
from refugee crises to share the burden.
63
 The commitment to 
achieving a more ―equitable sharing of responsibility‖ is important 
for encouraging all countries to honor the terms of the 1951 
 
 58. Id. at 134. ―Receiving countries usually have strong concerns about the economic, 
political, environmental and security implications of moving beyond encampment.‖ Id. at 135. 
―[I]n the aftermath of economic adjustment and democratization most [southern states] have 
been less willing to support local integration. This is in contrast to the situation in the 1960s and 
1970s when, in Africa, for instance, rural refugees were allowed a high level of de facto local 
integration.‖ Id. at 130. 
 59. Id. at 114.  
A marked decrease in financial contributions to [help long-standing refugee 
populations] has security implications, as refugees and local populations begin to 
compete for scarce resources. The lack of donor support has also reinforced the 
perception of refugees as a burden on host states, which now argue that the displaced 
put additional pressure on the environment, services, infrastructure and the local 
economy. 
Id.; see, e.g., CNN.com, Police patrol South Africa riot zone, May 21, 2008, http://www.cnn. 
com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/20/southafrica.violence/ (providing a recent example of the 
potentially violent effects of xenophobia on refugee populations). 
 60. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 142–46. 
 61. Id. at 142. 
 62. In 2006, the United States resettled 41,300 refugees, Australia 13,400, Canada 10,700, 
Sweden 2,400, Norway 1,000, and New Zealand 700. UNHCR, Report of the United Nations 
High Comm‘r for Refugees, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/62/12 (Oct. 11, 2007). 
 63. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 143. 
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Convention and the Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees 
(―1967 Protocol‖).64  
Although resettlement is a durable solution, less than one percent 
of the total refugee population is resettled each year.
65
 Because of the 
high monetary and social costs of refugee resettlement and 
integration, resettling countries limit the number of refugees admitted 
through resettlement each year.
66
 Unlike the duty of non-refoulement, 
countries have no affirmative obligation to resettle refugees.
67
 
Because of resettlement‘s limited scope, it is viewed as a complement 
to the other durable solutions.
68
 Resettlement must be considered in 
the context of the entire protracted refugee situation, since, for 
example, ―it may represent a disincentive to repatriation by 
encouraging some refugees to remain in the host state hoping to be 
resettled.‖69 
3. Non-refoulement and the Disparity in Resulting Responsibility 
The 1951 Convention defined a refugee as one who is outside his 
or her country of origin ―owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.‖70 The 1951 Convention 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. 84,651 refugees were resettled in 2004 out of the over nine million worldwide. Id. at 
146 fig.6.4; UNHCR, 2004 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, http://www.unhcr.org/44e5cd172. 
html. 
 66. See, for example, the United States Presidential Determination of the ceiling for 
refugee admissions, described infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
 67. UNHCR, Information on Refugee Resettlement, http://www.unhcr.org.ua/main.php? 
article_id=160&view=full (last visited Aug. 1. 2010). In fact, a minority of the world‘s 
countries have resettlement programs. Only sixteen countries resettled refugees in 2004, and 
only four of these countries resettled more than one thousand people. OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, 
supra note 19, at 146 fig.6.4.  
 68. Id. at 143 (―[R]esettlement can be used alongside other durable solutions as part of a 
comprehensive strategy to overcome protracted refugee situations.‖). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 1951 Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. The United States did not participate in the 
1951 Convention. See United Nations, Participants to the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, http://treaties.4n.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V 
~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en (last visited Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Participants to 
the 1951 Convention]. The 1951 Convention applied only to events occurring before January 1, 
1951. Id. In 1967, a new Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees extended the reach of the 
1951 Convention by removing temporal and geographic restrictions. See Protocol Relating to 
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also established rights for refugees, including the right of non-
refoulement, which ensures that ―[n]o contracting State shall expel or 
return . . . a refugee . . . where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.‖71 All signatories to 
the 1967 Protocol agreed to recognize this right of non-refoulement.
72
  
The practical implications of this agreement are significantly 
different for each country.
73
 Because non-refoulement applies only to 
those refugees already within another country‘s borders, the burden 
of refugee crises falls most directly on countries accessible to fleeing 
refugees: those surrounding the refugee-producing countries.
74
 The 
 
the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The United 
States did sign the 1967 Protocol. UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol [hereinafter States Parties to the 1951 Convention 
and 1967 Protocol], http://www.unhcrrlo.org/BasicFacts/Docs/States%20parties%20to%20the 
%20Convention&Protocol.pdf.  
 71. 1951 Convention, supra note 5, art. 33. ―[T]he framers of the Convention stipulated 
that refugees should have access to national courts, the right to employment and education, and 
a host of other social, economic and civil rights on a par with nationals of the host country.‖ 
LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 15. 
 72. According to Olivia Bueno, compliance with the principle of non-refoulement has 
been less than perfect. OLIVIA BUENO, INT‘L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, PERSPECTIVES ON 
REFOULEMENT IN AFRICA 4–7 (2006), http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/2006/ 
RefoulementinAfrica.pdf. In 2006, five African countries (often forced to shoulder the brunt of 
refugee burdens) received grades of D or F by the United States Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants. Id. at 4. D grades, representing instances of ―significant‖ refoulement, were 
received by the Central African Republic and Egypt. Id. F grades, given to countries with over 
one hundred cases of refoulement each year, were given to Burundi, Tanzania, and the Republic 
of South Africa. Id. 
 73. The concepts of ―burden-sharing‖ and ―responsibility-sharing‖ recognize the 
disproportionate effects of refugee movements and focus on alleviating the strain that falls 
mostly on regions neighboring refugees‘ countries of origin. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra 
note 19, at 184. 
 74. Id. ―[I]n contrast to the widely accepted and customary legal norm of non-
refoulement, the global refugee regime lacks an established legal framework to make states 
share the responsibility for long-term solutions.‖ Id. at 146. The disparity becomes even more 
apparent when those who have fled their home countries, but do not officially fit within the 
refugee definition are taken into consideration. See Alexander Betts & Esra Kaytaz, National 
and International Responses to the Zimbabwean Exodus: Implications for the Refugee 
Protection Regime (UNHCR Policy Dev. and Evaluation Serv., Research Paper No. 175, 2009), 
available at http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Betts-and-Kaytaz-
National-and-international-responses-to-the-Zimbabwean-exodus.pdf. The exodus of 
approximately two million nationals of Zimbabwe between 2005 and 2009 demonstrates the 
potential scale of non-refugee migrant impact. Id. at 2. Although these Zimbabweans did not 
leave voluntarily, they are not refugees under the definition provided by the 1951 Convention. 
Id. at 1.  
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vast majority of refugees are from lesser developed countries 
(―LDCs‖), and neighboring countries tend to be similarly poor.75 ―In 
Malawi, for example, where the GNP per capita is only $170, one in 
every ten persons is a refugee from Mozambique. This is the 
equivalent of the United States, a far richer country, suddenly 
admitting over 25 million Central Americans. . . .‖76 According to the 
UNHCR, developing countries host seventy-one percent of the 
world‘s refugees, asylum seekers, and others of UNHCR concern.77  
C. The United States’ Response to Refugees 
1. Asylum 
When a refugee is already within the borders of the United States, 
he is said to be an asylum seeker.
78
 Domestic immigration laws 
handle the policy and procedure of granting asylum.
79
 In 1952, 
Congress passed the basic legislation in force today, the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (―INA‖).80 The INA initially had no provisions 
that specifically addressed refugees; instead it utilized ad hoc 
measures and the attorney general‘s parole power.81 In 1965, 
 
 75. LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 2, at 8. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 114 (citing U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES 
AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2005 13 tbl.12 (2005), available at http://www. 
refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investigate/Publications_&_Archives/2005/ratios_of_refugees_to_h
ost_country_populations.pdf. 
 78. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: 
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS 8 (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RL32621.pdf. 
 79. The United States granted 25,270 requests for asylum in 2007. KELLY J. JEFFERYS & 
DANIEL C. MARTIN, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2007 5 tbl.6 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2007.pdf. 
 80. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952); see 
also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 16–17.  
 81. See, e.g., Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960); Refugee 
Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400, 403; Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. 
L. No. 80-774, § 4, 62 Stat. 1009. The Attorney General‘s parole power is authorized at INA 
§ 212(d)(5)(A), which states that, ―[t]he Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into 
the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case 
basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for 
admission to the United States . . . .‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006). Because this parole 
power is designed to be only temporary, however, Congress had to pass additional legislation 
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Congress amended the INA to officially recognize resettled refugees 
as a group of ―conditional entrants,‖ but limited the applicability of 
the new category to those fleeing political adversaries, such as the 
Soviet bloc or the Middle East.
82
 In 1968, the United States signed 
the 1967 Protocol, which incorporated the 1951 Convention.
83
 By 
doing so, the United States accepted the principle of non-
refoulement.
84
  
The Refugee Act of 1980 (―the 1980 Act‖)85 formally recognizes 
the obligation of non-refoulement created by the 1967 Protocol.
86
 
Under the 1980 Act, and in accordance with the principle of non-
refoulement, anyone within the physical borders of the United States 
is eligible to apply for asylum.
87
 To qualify for asylum, an applicant 
must meet the United States‘ definition of a refugee, which is based 
on the definition created in the 1951 Convention.
88
 A refugee must be 
 
before those brought in through the parole power could become legal permanent residents. See 
id. (―[B]ut such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when 
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the 
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled‖). 
Congress has passed several laws designed to allow certain paroled groups to attain legal 
permanent resident status. See Law Offices of Clark T. Trainor, PA, History of the United 
States Asylum Officer Corps, http://www.ailc.com/services/asylum/history.htm (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Asylum Officer Corps]. 
 82. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). The 
language of the 1965 version states as follows:  
Conditional entries shall next be made available . . . to aliens who satisfy an 
Immigration and Naturalization Service officer at an examination in any non-
Communist or non-Communist-dominated country, (A) that (i) because of persecution 
or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled 
(I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any 
country within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to 
return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion . . . . 
Id. § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. at 913. 
 83. See supra note 70. 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
 85. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1522 (2006). 
 86. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 893. ―[T]he Refugee Act of 1980 brought 
the United States statutory law into conformity with the Convention. Id.  
 87. ―Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United 
States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to 
the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), 
irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum . . . .‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2006) 
(specifying that statutory limitations or exceptions do not apply).  
 88. History of the Asylum Officer Corps, supra note 81. The 1967 Protocol incorporates 
the 1951 Convention, which provides: ―No Contracting State shall expel or return (―refouler‖) a 
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―unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, [his or her] country [of origin] 
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.‖89  
For those on United States soil who meet this definition, there are 
two distinct adjudication systems in place through which one may 
seek permission to remain in the country.
90
 A person may 
affirmatively apply for asylum by filing an application with the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (―USCIS‖).91 He 
or she is then scheduled for an interview with an asylum officer.
92
 
The asylum officer may grant asylum if the applicant satisfies the 
criteria established in the refugee definition.
93
 If the asylum officer 
does not grant the application, he or she does not conclusively deny 
asylum, but rather will refer the applicant to a formal hearing.
94
 At 
this time the applicant will generally be slotted for deportation, but 
may make a defensive application for asylum in front of an 
immigration judge.
95
 The defensive application is the statutory 
 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.‖ 1951 Convention, supra note 5, art. 33.1; see also 1967 Protocol, 
supra note 70 (incorporating and expanding upon the 1951 Convention). 
 89. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). The definition allows the President to specify a person 
still in the country of their nationality who meets the definition of a refugee and will therefore 
be eligible for rights associated with the designation. Id. The definition also excludes anyone 
from the refugee definition who, ―ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion,‖ as well as other explicit exceptions. Id. 
 90. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 1030–32. 
 91. Id. at 1030. The Affirmative Asylum Procedures Manual, published by the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, outlines the steps for affirmatively applying for 
asylum. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
MANUAL (2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/AffrmAsyManFNL. 
pdf. 
 92. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 1030. 
 93. Id. at 1030–31. The United States admitted 12,463 affirmative applicants in 2007. 
JEFFERYS & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 5 tbl.7; cf. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 43 tbl.16 (2009), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf 
(reporting 12,317 affirmative asylum applications granted in 2007, 146 fewer applications than 
stated in the previous source). 
 94. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 1031. 
 95. WASEM, supra note 78, at 9. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
312 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:297 
 
 
recognition of the duty of non-refoulement, referred to in United 
States domestic law as ―withholding of removal.‖96 The network of 
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) 
are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (―EOIR‖) 
within the United States Department of Justice (―DOJ‖).97 Although 
procedurally different, both the affirmative and defensive routes 
utilize the same legal standard and refugee definition.
98
 In both cases, 
the applicant has the burden of proving that he or she meets the 
definition of a refugee.
99
  
One issue with asylum adjudication is the inconsistency of 
adjudication results.
100
 High levels of inconsistency have been noted 
between immigration courts in different cities, as well as between 
individual immigration judges within the same court.
101
 This 
inconsistency can be at least partially attributed to the inherent 
subjectivity of refugee status determinations.
102
 The statute requires a 
―well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
 
 96. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 
892. Withholding of removal provides that, ―the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a 
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien‘s life or freedom would be threatened in 
that country because of the alien‘s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion,‖ subject to specific exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
Withholding of removal was previously referred to as ―withholding of deportation‖ until the 
terminology changed in 1997. History of the Asylum Officer Corps, supra note 81. 
 97. WASEM, supra note 78, at 9. The EOIR and BIA operate under the authority of the 
Attorney General, completely separate from USCIS. Id. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); see also Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Learning To Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 413 (2007) (explaining the asylum adjudication process, the importance of 
consistency, and the inherent difficulty in achieving consistency). Cf. TRAC Immigration, 
Latest Data from Immigration Courts Show Decline in Asylum Disparity (2009), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/209 (noting that levels of disparity among decisions by 
immigration judges declined during 2006–07). TRAC compiles statistics on federal 
enforcement, staffing, and spending, including asylum grant rates for immigration judges. See 
generally TRAC Immigration, http://trac.syr.edu/ (last visited Aug. 1. 2010).  
 101. See sources cited supra note 100. 
 102. See Arthur Glass, Subjectivity and Refugee Fact-Finding, in FORCED MIGRATION, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY 213, 214 (Jane McAdam ed., 2008) (noting the aspects of fact-
finding in refugee adjudications that make determinations especially subjective). 
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opinion,‖103 but leaves interpretation of this requirement up to the 
individual decision maker.
104
 There is often very little evidence to 
support applicants‘ testimony, and so the determination may depend 
simply on whether the judge finds the applicant believable.
105
 In 
addition, a judge‘s degree of cultural sensitivity may play a 
significant role in his or her degree of understanding, which could 
ultimately affect the determination.
106
  
Statistics on individual judges‘ denial ratings reveal that within 
the same court, rates can vary drastically.
107
 In New York between 
2001 and 2006, asylum denial rates for individual judges ranged from 
9.5 percent to 91.6 percent, meaning that one judge denied one out of 
every ten applicants, while another denied nine out of every ten 
applicants.
108
 Such statistics suggest the outcome of an application 
may well depend on the court and the immigration judge assigned to 
the case.
109
 
Consistency is recognized as important in adjudication for several 
reasons.
110
 Intuitively, it indicates a sense of equal treatment for 
similarly situated individuals and therefore provides fairness.
111
 As a 
more practical matter, inconsistency inhibits stability and certainty in 
the legal system.
112
 This makes results unpredictable for parties and 
presents society with conflicting norms regarding acceptable 
 
 103. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 104. Glass, supra note 102, at 213–14. 
 105. Id. at 214. 
 106. See id.  
 107. Data on asylum application denial ratings for many individual immigration judges are 
available from the TRAC Immigration Project Website. TRAC Immigration, http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/index.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 108. TRAC Immigration, Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions by Immigration Court: Fiscal 
Years 2001–2006, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/183/include/1_judgelist.html. 
 109. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 100, at 378.  
Whether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the United States or is deported to 
a country in which he claims to fear persecution is very seriously influenced by a spin 
of the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk‘s random assignment of an applicant's case 
to one asylum officer rather than another, or one immigration judge rather than 
another.  
Id. 
 110. Legomsky, supra note 100, at 425–28. 
 111. Id. at 425. 
 112. Id. at 426. 
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conduct.
113
 Some inconsistency is unavoidable given the nature of 
these particular adjudications.
114
 Recommendations for improving 
consistency generally advocate for modest changes, such as increased 
training and more rigorous requirements for immigration judges, as 
opposed to a more detailed legal standard or overhaul of the current 
system.
115
 
2. Attempts to Minimize Obligations 
Despite the strong humanitarian reasons for honoring the 1951 
Convention, signatories often attempt to limit the obligations they 
encounter through the duty of non-refoulement.
116
 Refugees impose a 
heavy economic burden on host countries.
117
 Although the UNHCR 
may provide assistance, the country of refuge will often face much of 
the cost of extremely needy refugee populations on its own.
118
 This is 
especially an issue of concern in developing countries where 
resources are already scarce.
119
 Even in the United States, a relatively 
rich country, the perception of social assistance given to resettled 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 473. ―In asylum cases, the unavoidable abstractness, complexity, and dynamism 
of the relevant legal language make it inevitable that the human adjudicators will bring their 
diverse emotions and personal values to bear on their decisions.‖ Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 100, at 379–89. 
 116. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text (discussing a tactic used to minimize 
or circumvent non-refoulement obligations); see also Michele Berg, Banished on the Bases: 
Refugees and Asylum seekers Denied Rights in Europe, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004 106 
(2004) (criticizing Great Britain‘s refusal to allow asylum seekers in its Sovereign Base Areas 
(SBAs), British-sovereign territory, on the East and West coasts of Cyprus to apply for asylum 
status). 
 117. The experience of Tanzania demonstrates the challenges faced by countries hosting 
large refugee populations. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 102–03 box 4.3. ―At 
the end of 2004, Tanzania was host to more than 400,000 refugees spread over 11 refugee 
camps in western Tanzania and an estimated 200,000 in refugee settlements in [other areas].‖ 
Id. at 102 box 4.3. ―The [Tanzanian] government frequently says there has been no tangible 
benefit from hosting them, only a drain of its limited resources.‖ Id. at 103 box 4.3. 
 118. See id. at 100. UNHCR funds are limited to begin with and the funds often 
constrained by donor restrictions: ―the high degree of earmarking of funds by donors precludes 
the allocation of resources in proportion to need.‖ Id. Requests to the UNHCR for funds are 
made through a Consolidated Appeals Process (―CAP‖). Id. However, ―[c]onsolidated appeals 
are consistently under-funded, even though donors declare their commitment to the process. In 
2004, only 60 per cent of humanitarian assistance requested by the CAP was actually received.‖ 
Id. 
 119. Id. at 70. 
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refugees has a history of dampening public support for the refugee 
cause.
120
 Host communities that initially welcome refugees may 
develop xenophobic ill will if economic tensions arise because 
refugees worsen existing problems.
121
 
Nations‘ practical reasons for not welcoming refugees receive 
theoretical support from the concept of national sovereignty.
122
 
Although the 1951 Convention states that refugees have the right not 
to be returned to a country of persecution, the 1951 Convention does 
not impose an affirmative duty on countries to admit refugees.
123
 The 
right to exclude non-citizens is one of the most fundamental in a 
nation‘s concept of sovereignty.124 This creates a significant tension 
between the humanitarian obligation of non-refoulement and the 
sovereign right to exclude.
125
 By signing the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol, states seemingly agree to waive at least a portion of 
their right to exclude.
126
 However, sovereignty is still a powerful 
force in foreign policy, and it has been used to justify a narrow 
interpretation of the agreed-upon obligations to refugees.
127
 
 
 120. See Robert L. Bach, Third Country Resettlement, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 49, at 313, 325–26. 
 121. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 81 box 3.4.  
 122. See Joy M. Purcell, A Right to Leave, but Nowhere to Go: Reconciling an Emigrant’s 
Right to Leave with the Sovereign’s Right to Exclude, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177, 
192–94 (2007). 
 123. See id. at 205 (noting that no country acknowledges a right to immigrate); see also 
LOESCHER ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 (―The 1951 Convention also defined a list of rights for 
refugees. . . . However, states decided not to grant refugees a right of asylum, notwithstanding 
the provisions of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.‖). 
 124. See Purcell, supra note 122, at 192 (explaining how, once the Supreme Court 
established the right to exclude in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), such 
a right was all but universally recognized). 
 125. See id. at 196–98. 
 126. Id. at 198. ―Acceptance of the duties under the United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees for example, demonstrates that consenting nations have essentially 
waived their right to exclude pursuant to international obligations.‖ Id. But note the slight 
distinction between a waiver of the ―right to exclude‖ and the actual agreement not to ―expel or 
return a refugee.‖ The first formulation suggests a waiver of the ability to prevent a refugee 
from entering, while the second applies when a refugee is already present within the country‘s 
borders. 
 127. For example, Australia‘s Prime Minister John Howard, using the concept of national 
sovereignty to justify turning away the Tampa, a ship carrying 400 refugees, said: ―While this is 
a humanitarian, decent country . . . we are not a soft touch. We are not a nation whose sovereign 
rights . . . are going to be trampled on.‖ Peter Shadbolt, Australians Ban Ship Laden with 
Afghan Refugees, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 28, 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
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The United States and others have taken advantage of their 
relative geographic isolation in an attempt to limit their obligations 
under the duty of non-refoulement.
128
 Both the United States and 
Australia have employed the practice of stopping boats of refugees in 
the water before they reach their shores.
129
 In such cases, they have 
sought to prevent refugees from physically crossing their borders in 
order to avoid the application of the duty of non-refoulement, a tactic 
heavily criticized by the international community.
130
 Many assert it 
constitutes a breach of the duty of non-refoulement under the 1951 
Convention.
131
 
3. Resettlement 
Refugee resettlement in the United States began with the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948.
132
 The Act applied to those displaced 
by World War II and was used to resettle over 400,000 European 
refugees to the United States by 1951.
133
 The United States was not a 
 
australiaandthepacific/australia/1338765/Australians-bar-ship-laden-with-Afghan-refugees.html. 
See also Susan Kneebone, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Extraterritorial Processing of 
Asylum Seekers: The ‘Safe Third Country’ Concept, in FORCED MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND SECURITY, supra note 102, at 129, 148 (criticizing the Australian government‘s invocation 
of the sovereignty concept in defending its actions in the Tampa incident). 
 128. ―Rich countries have avoided responsibility through exclusionary or deterrent policies 
and their distance from regions of refugee origin.‖ OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 2, at 
146. 
 129. Angus Francis, Bringing Protection Home: Healing the Schism between International 
Obligations and National Safeguards Created by Extraterritorial Processing, 20 INT‘L J. 
REFUGEE L. 273, 273 (2008) (citing Memoranda of Understanding that establish intake facilities 
on territory outside that of the potential host countries); see also Robert Suro, Jamaica Will 
Help U.S. Process Haitians: Agreement Reached to Host Refugee Facility, Perhaps on Large 
Ships, WASH. POST, June 1, 1994, at A1.  
 130. See, e.g., Danielle Every, A Reasonable, Practical and Moderate Humanitarianism: 
The Co-Option of Humanitarianism in the Australian Asylum Seeker Debates, 21 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 210, 221–22 (2008); see also European Press Review, BBC NEWS, Aug. 30, 2001, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1516108.stm (providing an overview of the reaction to the Tampa 
incident from various newspapers across Europe).  
 131. According to Germany‘s Frankfurter Rundshau, ―[Australia‘s response] ‗marks a low 
point in international refugee policy and constitutes a breach of the 1951 convention on 
refugees.‘‖ European Press Review, supra note 130.  
 132. Displaced Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). 
 133. Daniel J. Steinbock, The Qualities of Mercy: Maximizing the Impact of the U.S. 
Refugee Resettlement, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 951, 956 n.18 (2003) (citing Michael J. 
Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in Immigration Law, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 443, 445 (1998)). 
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signatory to the original 1951 Convention, but began financially 
supporting the UNHCR in the mid-1950s and eventually signed the 
1967 Protocol, which incorporated the 1951 Convention.
134
  
During the Cold War, the United States realized refugee 
resettlement could be used as a political weapon.
135
 The United States 
welcomed refugees from Communist regimes as a propaganda tool to 
embarrass ideological adversaries.
136
 People who came from 
communist countries were considered to be ―voting with their feet by 
leaving.‖137 ―Labeling the emigrants as refugees—people with a fear 
of persecution—further tar[red] the source country.‖138 Refugees 
came largely from Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, China, Cuba, and 
later Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
139
 Less than two thousand of the 
one and a half million refugees admitted between World War II and 
1980 came from non-communist countries.
140
 Until 1980, the 
authority for refugee admissions came from congressional legislation 
or the presidential parole power.
141
 In both cases, permission for 
resettlement was allocated only to specific groups involved in 
particular crises.
142
  
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States 
Congress created a permanent process that continues to govern 
American resettlement policy today.
143
 The purpose of the Act was 
―to end an ad hoc approach to refugee admissions and resettlement 
that had characterized U.S. refugee policy since World War II.‖144 
According to the Act, the President determines the number of 
 
 134. LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY, supra note 2, at 66–67; see States Parties to the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, supra note 70.  
 135. Meital Waibsnaider, Note, How National Self-Interest and Foreign Policy Continue to 
Influence the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 396–97 (2006). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Steinbock, supra note 133, at 981. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 956. 
 140. Waibsnaider, supra note 135, at 396. 
 141. Steinbock, supra note 133, at 956. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 957. 
 144. ANDORRA BRUNO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND 
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 1 (2006), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2006, 
0215-crs.pdf. 
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refugees to be admitted each year after ―appropriate consultation.‖145 
The President apportions the number of slots among regions of the 
world as ―is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the 
national interest.‖146 Though the numbers are often considered 
targets, they are officially the ceilings for refugee admissions.
147
 The 
President may, however, allow for additional refugees in the case of 
―an unforeseen refugee emergency.‖148 The number of resettled 
refugees has fluctuated from 207,000 in 1980 to 27,000 in 2002.
149
  
The presidential determination of yearly refugee quotas has been 
criticized on several grounds.
150
 Although the Refugee Act allows for 
admission of refugees based on either humanitarian concern or as 
otherwise in the national interest, the trend is for national interest, in 
particular foreign policy, to be the overwhelming motivation for 
presidential determinations.
151
 This was especially the case during the 
Cold War, when foreign policy interests dictated resettlement 
policy.
152
 Today, presidential determinations are influenced much 
more by domestic political pressure and public opinion. While this is 
a welcome change, it is still not ideal for those who feel humanitarian 
need should drive resettlement policy.
153
 
 
 145. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3) (2006).  
 146. Id. § 1157(a)(2). The Presidential Determination for fiscal year 2009 allots for the 
resettlement of 80,000 refugees to be apportioned as follows: Africa-12,000, East Asia-19,000, 
Europe and Central Asia-2,500, Latin America/Caribbean-4,500, Near East/South Asia-37,000, 
Unallocated Reserve-5,000. Presidential Determination No. 2008-29, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,865 (Oct. 
7, 2008). 
 147. There have been calls to treat the quotas as goals for admissions, rather than ceilings. 
See DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: REFORMS FOR 
A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 30–38 (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/36495.pdf. 
 148. ―If the President determines, after appropriate consultation, that (1) an unforeseen 
emergency refugee situation exists, (2) the admission of certain refugees in response to the 
emergency refugee situation is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the 
national interest . . . the President may fix a number of refugees to be admitted to the United 
States . . . in response to the emergency refugee situation.‖ 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (2006). 
 149. Steinbock, supra note 133, at 957. 
 150. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Making of United States Refugee Policy: Separation 
of Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 70 WASH. L. REV. 675 (1995); Waibsnaider, supra note 
135.  
 151. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 887. 
 152. See Legomsky, supra note 150, at 698. 
 153. Id. at 699. Professor Legomsky suggests a more humanitarian focus could be achieved 
by creating a Refugee Board to determine refugee quotas with the explicit purpose of easing 
suffering and promoting human rights. Id. at 708–13. 
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The United States allows application for resettlement based on a 
priority system that structures the process.
154
 Refugees may apply for 
resettlement based on their position in one of five priority categories, 
designated P-1 through P-5.
155
 The P-1 category is comprised of 
referrals from the UNHCR and United States embassies, and focuses 
on ―compelling cases.‖156 P-1 refugees were traditionally referred on 
an individual basis, but may now also be referred as groups.
157
 
Examples of P-1 refugees include victims of torture or violence, 
physically or mentally disabled persons, former political prisoners, 
women at risk, and persons in need of urgent medical care.
158
 The P-2 
category consists of specifically identified groups of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States.
159
 Recent examples of 
these groups include the ―Lost Boys‖ of Sudan, ethnic leaders and 
political activists from Burma, and mixed marriage families from 
Bosnia.
160
 Categories P-3 through P-5 represent access for those with 
family relations in the United States.
161
 Such access is only available 
to people of certain nationalities in certain relationships.
162
  
P-1 referrals are assessed using an adjudication procedure. 
Refugee status determinations are made after the applicant interviews 
with either a staff member from the Refugee Division within the 
Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖), or as of 2006, with a 
member of the specialized Refugee Corps within the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (―USCIS‖).163 As in the 
 
 154. See MARTIN, supra note 147, at 62–99. 
 155. Id. at 62–63. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 64. 
 158. Id. at 63. 
 159. Id. at 64. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 66. 
 162. Id. ―P-3 includes spouses, minor children, and parents . . . .‖ Id. ―P-4 covers married 
sons and daughters, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren. P-5 covers uncles, aunts, nieces, 
nephews, and first cousins.‖ Id. at 66 n.11. 
 163. Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff in Commemoration of 
World Refugee Day, Dep‘t of Homeland Sec. (June 20, 2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ 
releases/press_release_0931.shtm; see also USCIS Initiates New Refugee Officer Corps, USCIS 
TODAY (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 5, http:// 
www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCISToday_Nov_05.pdf. ―In FY05, USCIS officers 
conducted over 65,000 interviews in 51 countries for refugee applicants from over 60 nations. 
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domestic asylum application process, the relevant determination is 
whether the applicant meets the definition of a refugee, namely, 
whether he or she has ―a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion. . . .‖164 Additionally, the consistency of 
interviewer determinations is an issue in the resettlement context, 
with reports of different groups of interviewers returning varying 
approval ratings for similar groups of applicants.
165
  
4. Asylum and Resettlement Compared 
In addition to the inherent inconsistencies in refugee 
determinations, interviewers are encouraged to apply the refugee 
definition differently depending on whether the applicant is in the 
United States or overseas. Overseas interviewers are encouraged to 
use a more flexible application of the standard in the resettlement 
context, as explained in a report commissioned for DHS: 
It makes sense to use a generous interpretation of the standard 
in the overseas program, even though the government should 
continue to use a more strict approach in asylum adjudications 
involving persons who have already reached US soil. This 
difference in emphasis is appropriate because the United States 
remains in full control of the volume of overseas admissions in 
any case. To be more precise, for asylum applications in the 
United States, the only real control on the volume of ultimate 
admissions as asylees is the refugee definition.
166
  
No empirical evidence exists as to the degree to which the 
differing standards affect an applicant‘s chance of admittance as a 
refugee, as compared to that same applicant‘s chance of admittance 
as an asylum seeker.
167
 Anecdotal evidence does, however, confirm 
 
Almost 54,000 refugees were admitted to the U.S. for resettlement, almost 150 new immigrants 
each day.‖ Id.  
 164. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 165. See MARTIN, supra note 147, at 104–06. The inconsistency within a group of 
interviewers may be somewhat alleviated by the recent decision to appoint a single group 
supervisor to review the determinations of interviewers in the group. Id. at 104. 
 166. Id. at 105 (emphasis added). 
 167. The lack of direct empirical evidence can be attributed to (1) the extreme unlikelihood 
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the intuitive conclusion that the differing standards mean some 
percentage of applicants denied asylum in the United States would be 
accepted if they were overseas.
168
  
For those chosen for overseas resettlement, both international and 
American agencies provide assistance at each stage of resettlement.
169
 
The International Organization for Migration (―IOM‖) arranges for 
transportation of the refugees,
170
 USCIS adjudicates applications for 
refugee status,
171
 and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (―ORR‖) 
assists with integration into American communities.
172
 In contrast, 
domestic asylum-seekers must get to the United States themselves 
and file their own applications; if their status is approved, they must 
figure out how to integrate into an American community.
173
  
 
that one individual would apply through both the domestic asylum channels and the overseas 
resettlement channel, and (2) the non-fungibility of applicants‘ personal histories and situations. 
The general denial rates of adjudication in both instances can be compared, and reveal a much 
higher rate of denial in the domestic asylum situation. However, whether this comparison is 
indicative of the standard used is suspect because of the differences in applicant pools.  
 168. From 2004–09, Katie Herbert Meyer served as the Legal Director of Interfaith Legal 
Services for Immigrants, a non-profit organization representing low-income clients in the St. 
Louis, Missouri, metro area. According to Ms. Meyer, there is a general perception among 
practitioners in the local community that clients would have a better chance of attaining refugee 
status if their applications were evaluated through overseas adjudication. This contributes to the 
general frustration resulting from what appears to be impossibly high denial rates of some 
judges. Telephone Interview with Katie Herbert Meyer, Legal Dir. and Staff Attorney, 
Interfaith Legal Servs. for Immigrants (Feb. 11, 2009). 
 169. See USCIS Initiates New Refugee Officer Corps, supra note 163, at 5. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. The Office of Refugee Resettlement is part of the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services. See Office of Refugee Resettlement (―ORR‖), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/orr/index.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). The mission statement of the ORR states 
that its purpose is to help integrate resettled refugees: ―Founded on the belief that newly 
arriving populations have inherent capabilities when given opportunities, the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) provides people in need with critical resources to assist them in becoming 
integrated members of American society.‖ ORR: Mission Statement, http://www.acfhhs.gov/ 
programs/orr/about/mission.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 173. ―Asylees are individuals who, on their own, travel to the United States and apply 
for/receive a grant of asylum.‖ ORRL: Who We Serve, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/ 
about/whoweserve-2.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). For the steps an asylum-seeker must take 
to affirmatively apply for asylum, see the AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra 
note 91. Asylum-seekers do not receive any assistance while their applications are pending; 
they ―are eligible for ORR-funded benefits and services beginning on the date of final grant of 
asylum.‖ ORR: Who we Serve, supra. See generally WELCOME TO THE UNITED STATES: A 
GUIDE FOR NEW IMMIGRANTS, http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/M-618.pdf 
(exemplifying the materials expected to assist in integration).  
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II. ANALYSIS 
Overseas resettlement is one way the United States shares the 
burden of alleviating humanitarian crises associated with refugee 
displacement.
174
 Because the United States is somewhat 
geographically isolated and bordered by two stable nations, it is 
largely sheltered from refugee movements.
175
 At times, the United 
States has taken additional steps to discourage potential asylum-
seekers, actions criticized as contrary to the spirit of the Refugee 
Convention.
176
  
Although the United States may at times operate on the verge of 
violating non-refoulement, it also voluntarily resettles the largest 
number of refugees in the world.
177
 However, this is not accidental. 
The United States prefers to shift as many refugee admissions as 
possible to the resettlement program because it has no affirmative 
duty to assist refugees located overseas.
178
 By altering legal standards 
and channeling refugees through the resettlement program, the 
United States can control its obligation and involvement.
179
 Like 
 
 174. Another way the United States helps shoulder the burden is through its financial 
contributions to the UNHCR. See discussion supra note 35. Despite the resettlement of refugees 
and the monetary contributions, however, LDCs still shoulder a disproportionate amount of the 
refugee burden. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 175. Cf. supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. Examples include the interception of 
boats before they reach United States shores and national security legislation creating additional 
barriers to entry. Although beyond the scope of this Note, the immigration restrictions 
implemented to address national security in the wake of September 11th have become an issue 
of significant debate. Rodger Haines QC, National Security and Non-Refoulement in New 
Zealand: Commentary on Zaoui vs Attorney-General (No 2), in FORCED MIGRATION, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND SECURITY, supra note 102, at 63 (2008); Penelope Mathew, Resolution 1373—A 
Call to Pre-empt Asylum Seekers? (or ‘Osama, the Asylum Seeker’), in FORCED MIGRATION, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY, supra note 102, at 19. 
 177. The United States consistently resettles refugees in numbers far larger than any other 
country. See OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 141 fig.6.2. For example, in 2004 the 
United States resettled 52,868 refugees, and the next three largest resettlers of refugees were 
Australia with 15,967, Canada with 10,521, and Sweden with 1,801. Id. at 146 fgr.6.4. 
 178. The duty of non-refoulement applies only to those refugees who are already within a 
country‘s borders. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 33 (―No contracting State shall expel or 
return . . . a refugee.‖(emphasis added)). ―Resettlement and financial contributions to support 
local integration or repatriation have historically been discretionary acts by governments.‖ 
OFFICE OF THE UNHCR, supra note 19, at 146. 
 179. See supra Part I.C. ―In the overseas program, the United States can apply a variety of 
other screening tools (such as the precise limitations on access categories) to assure that 
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other efforts to limit refugee obligations, altering standards, if not an 
outright violation of non-refoulement, certainly runs contrary to its 
spirit.
180
 
Refugee flows and the events that cause them are never 
planned.
181
 Unpredictability is therefore a characteristic inherent in 
refugee crises. By ensuring that its own obligation remains stable, the 
United States forces other countries to absorb the entire cost created 
by the uncertainty of refugee flux.
182
 This means that, as compared to 
the physical burden of actual refugees, the burden of unpredictability 
is borne even more disproportionately by the world‘s LDCs. 
The United States‘ policy of encouraging inconsistent application 
of the law sacrifices consistency in adjudication and equitable 
treatment of individuals for predictability.
183
 The policy creates a 
system of immigration in which applicants who pay their own travel 
expenses to the United States and receive no resettlement services are 
at a disadvantage compared to individuals with similar legal 
qualifications who are interviewed overseas.
184
 As previously noted, 
 
admissions do not exceed a pre-set level.‖ MARTIN, supra note 147, at 105. The concept of 
resettlement has itself been criticized because it allows resettling countries (1) to externalize the 
selection process and avoid hosting and receiving applicants, and (2) to selectively choose those 
refugees who best suit its own needs. See Resettlement vs Right of Asylum, MIGREUROP (Apr. 
2006), http://www.migreurop.org/article916.html. Such critics fear resettlement programs are a 
way for wealthier countries to avoid the duty to allow domestic asylum applications under non-
refoulement. See id.; see also Marie-Paule Bourassa, La réinstallation des réfugiés dans un 
pays tiers: une solution à double trenchant [The Resettlement of Refugees in Third Countries: A 
Double-Edged Sword], Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Droit International Des Migrations 
(Oct. 8, 2007), http://cdim.cerium.ca/La-reinstallation-des-refugies (stating that control over 
migratory inflows is a main objective of resettlement).  
 180. See supra notes 129–31 (mentioning examples of international reactions to efforts to 
minimize refugee obligations). 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
 182. Concerns about the impact of resettled refugees on the United States‘ social services 
program highlight the costs of absorbing such refugees into society. See Lavinia Limon, 
Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Testimony on Use of Welfare by Immigrants (Feb. 6, 
1996), http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960206a.html. One can imagine that an unknown burden 
on the United States social services programs would make their operation much more difficult.  
 183. The current system promotes the United States‘ control over the inflow of refugees, 
but assesses individuals differently depending on their physical location. See, e.g., supra note 
165 and accompanying text. 
 184. Refugees who receive the favorable resettlement standard also benefit from significant 
government services. The Office of Refugee Resettlement had a 2007 enacted budget of 
$587,847,000 to appropriate for various forms of assistance for resettled refugees. See ORR 
Appropriations, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/funding/appropriations.htm (last visited 
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inconsistency in refugee and asylum adjudications raises concerns 
regarding fairness, predictability, and certainty.
185
 A degree of 
inconsistency is inherent in refugee and asylum determinations, but 
the United States‘ policy exacerbates this problem by encouraging an 
inconsistent application of the refugee definition. This need not be 
the case, however, since systems could be implemented that reflect 
national interests without encouraging inconsistent legal standards.
186
 
III. PROPOSAL 
Assuming that predictability retains its current importance in 
immigration policy,
187
 the United States should still strive for the best 
policy that achieves that goal. The current resettlement program in 
the United States achieves predictability by adhering to the ceilings 
set each year by the President.
188
 In contrast, the number of asylum 
seekers granted status through domestic adjudication can never be 
known for sure, since non-refoulement requires the United States to 
admit anyone within its borders who meets the refugee definition. 
Non-refoulement creates an obligation that puts the number of 
asylees outside of the United States‘ control.  
Predictability for the total number of those who meet the refugee 
definition could be obtained by considering overseas resettlement and 
the domestic asylum process as two components of a single program. 
Consistency in the resettlement context is currently achieved by 
setting a ceiling for the number of those admitted. A ceiling could be 
 
Aug. 1. 2010). This is in contrast to asylum seekers, who are largely on their own for 
transportation and asylum application, and receive no services to help them enter a new 
community. 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 110–14. 
 186. See infra Part III. 
 187. When considering the United States‘ immigration policy, the appropriate tradeoff 
between predictability and an equitable sharing of the refugee burden depends on an 
individual‘s evaluation of the weight that should be given to each of these concerns. The proper 
balancing of national priorities is an extremely worthy debate, but one that will depend 
significantly on personal opinion. This Note seeks to highlight the tension between priorities 
and promote consideration of the potential ethical issues presented by United States refugee and 
asylum law.  
 188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (2000); supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text 
(describing the statutory authority for the Presidential determinations). The President has the 
authority to alter these determinations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b); supra note 148.  
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set for the total number of people admitted under the refugee 
definition. This number would include both those granted asylum 
from within the United States and those brought to the United States 
through overseas resettlement. Because the number of refugees 
resettled is discretionary, the United States could alter this number 
and still be sure to honor its obligation under the principle of non-
refoulement. The number of resettled refugees would be altered to 
account for any increases or decreases in the number of asylum-
seekers granted refugee status. 
The mechanics of implementing such a change would require only 
a few additional steps in setting the presidential determination of 
refugee quotas for a given year. This new presidential determination 
would be computed by adding together the desired number of 
resettled refugees (the current refugee quota) and the projected 
number of asylum-seekers for the given year. Depending on whether 
grants of asylum were higher or lower than the projected number, the 
following year‘s presidential determination would be raised or 
lowered by that amount.
189
 In essence, the proposed presidential 
determination of refugee quotas would change the number of 
resettled refugees to account for the higher or lower levels of asylum 
seekers that are granted status.
190
  
 
 189. Application to the following year‘s quota numbers is already done in other 
immigration contexts, such as employment visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(6)(B) (2006) (―The 
number of visas made available in any fiscal year under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall each 
be reduced by 1/3 the number of visas made available in the previous fiscal year to special 
immigrants described in section 1101(a)(27)(K) of this title.‖). 
 190. The proposed Presidential Determination would be the total number of both refugees 
and asylees in a given year. The difference between the projected number of asylees and the 
actual number of asylees would be taken into account in the next year‘s Determination. The 
following formula represents the mechanics of calculating the proposed Presidential 
Determination.  
Where: 
Rx = the maximum number of refugees to be admitted in year x;  
APx = the projected number of asylees in year x; 
AAx = the actual number of asylees in year x; and, 
PDx = the newly proposed Presidential Determination in year x; 
The following is the proposed equation: 
PDx = Rx + APx – (AAx-1 - APx-1) 
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By linking asylee inflows to the discretionary resettlement quota, 
the United States could ensure predictability and therefore encourage 
a uniform application of the refugee definition. Because any 
unexpected increase in asylees would be accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease in resettled refugees, adjudicators would not 
have to favor applicants in one venue over another in order to achieve 
predictability. Although this would make the United States‘ 
insistence on control more obvious, it would be a more honest policy, 
and in actuality only externalize an objective the United States 
already pursues indirectly. Implementing this newly proposed method 
for calculating the Presidential determination of refugee quotas would 
not only ensure predictability, but would also ensure compliance with 
non-refoulement and avoid an unfair and inconsistent application of 
the law.  
CONCLUSION 
The United States values consistency and stability in its 
humanitarian obligation to assist refugees. Its current policy reflects 
this by attempting to channel refugees through the overseas 
resettlement process, where there is no affirmative obligation, as 
compared to through the domestic asylum process, where the duty of 
non-refoulement requires that the United States admit any refugees 
on its soil. Although a predictable and stable refugee burden is a 
legitimate state interest, the United States should evaluate the larger 
implications of any policy it uses to achieve this goal. The current 
method of encouraging an inconsistent application of the refugee 
 
This assumes that, for the first year of this equation‘s use, the previous year‘s projected and 
actual number of asylees were the same, resulting in: (AAx-1 - APx-1)= 0. After the first year, the 
actual values for each of the variables could be inputted as they are described.  
 As mentioned previously, American immigration law already uses the concept of altering 
quotas based on the previous year‘s numbers. See supra note 189. This is significant because it 
demonstrates that employing such a scheme would be administratively manageable. It may be 
desirable, however, to leave the numbers separated in order to emphasize that the United States 
continues to abide by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Officially combining the 
numbers might suggest that the United States was pre-deciding the number of people that would 
receive asylum. Under the principle of non-refoulement, such a pre-determination would violate 
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. If the United States conceptually used the above 
formula, but only publicized PDx = Rx – (AAx-1 - APx-1) as the Presidential Determination, it 
would produce the same result and perhaps avoid confusion and unfounded criticism.  
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definition has a significant impact on the individuals involved, 
domestic immigration policy, and the international effort to 
ameliorate the refugee problem. If it is possible to achieve 
predictability without the negative consequences of an inconsistent 
legal standard, the United States should explore such alternatives. 
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